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Abstract 
In unravelling the question of sexual difference and the (non-)relation between the sexes, 
Jacques Lacan alludes to, draws on and restages Freud’s infamous myth of the primal horde. 
Core to this myth is, of course, the figure of the father. The contemporary suspicion of a crisis 
in masculinity – variously linked to a toxic (sexual) aggression, de-masculation, dislocation 
and failure of identity – would suggest that the myth has lost its relevance and its explanatory 
value. This paper revisits Lacan’s reading of the myth, linking it to his earlier discussion of 
Antigone, from his The Ethics of Psychoanalysis seminar, to show how Lacan had not only 
succeeded in excavating the logical core of Freud's myth, but also presented us with a radical 
new way of understanding the binary of sexual positions, an understanding which refigures the 
choice of sexual position as an ethical choice. 
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It has increasingly become something of a commonplace to allude to a crisis in masculinity. 
On the one hand, such a supposed crisis is celebrated as the harbinger of the downfall of 
patriarchy. On the other, the crisis points to a lamentable loss of faith in the ‘true male’. Yet 
others would argue that the crisis is a fabrication, a poisonous cultural lie; paradoxically, 
then, asserting the crisis in the very act of denying it. The positions here tend to ground 
themselves in convenient axioms, branded as truths. While there is a tendency within these 
arguments to appeal to science – either in terms of the biological givens of the body or 
evolutionary behavioural traits – the debate itself might be understood to concern the 
meaning of masculinity. Such meaning then articulates to a mode or function of 
identification. What is often missed in such arguments, however, is the (logical) fact that 
identification cannot be reduced to biology. This point is comparable to Hume’s guillotine – 
the fact that you cannot derive an ought from an is. Whatever the biological givens (and no 
matter how contested or otherwise these are), the movement to identify with any one 
characteristic or set of traits, whether physical or behavioural, is necessarily distinct from the 
facticity of that characteristic or set of traits. This is clearly illustrated in cases of 
transgenderism where the ‘obvious’ biological markers do not line up with the subjective 
identification. But it is, then, just as clearly illustrated in cisgenderism, where they do. To 
reduce identification to an aspect of the biological given is simply to move the point of 
subjective embrace further down the line, resulting in a reductio ad infinitum (see Neill, 
2016, chapters 9 and 10). If I am biologically determined to be that, what accounts for my 
embrace of this position? If the answer is my biological determinism, then what accounts for 
my embrace of that position? And so on, and so on. The answer here necessarily points in 
two directions. First, there is the point or process of identification and the logic that governs 
this. Second – but supposedly chronologically prior to this – there is the necessity of positing 
some ground which would cover the impossible origins. That is to say, if the point of 
identification cannot be accounted for through the scientific, then something else is required 
to halt this drift, something that will cover over the impossibility of the absence of a fixed 
ground. This function of covering over is the very definition of myth. The process of 
identification which articulates with this is what we would call fantasy. 
 
This article returns us to Freud’s (1913/1955) myth of the Primal Father and considers this in 
the context of Lacan’s (1975b/1999) reworking of the myth in his Seminar XX, showing how 
Lacan’s version helps to productively separate the logical moments of myth and fantasy. The 
effect of this separation is to allow us to appreciate the properly ethical moment implied in 
this movement. Here we will turn to Lacan’s discussion of Antigone in  his Seminar VII and 
show how his discussion of Antigone links with his graph of sexuation some thirteen years 
later. The conjunction of these two points of Lacan’s oeuvre allows us to posit a response to 
the current debate around the crisis of masculinity (and sex and gender more widely) which is 
neither hopelessly reduced to the biological, nor conveniently tethered to convention, but is, 
rather, uncomfortably, but hopefully, located in the ethical.   
 
When, in the fourth chapter of Totem and Taboo, Freud presents us with the myth of the 
primal horde, he describes it simply and eloquently, allowing it, as with all good myths, to 
unfold as a story, but also to resonate with a power and sense beyond its surface. Freud is 
careful to emphasise that what he is relating has never been the object of observation (Freud, 
1913, p. 141), that the story does not emerge from something witnessed and passed down, 
and yet he tells it as though it has been told countless times before. Already shrouding its 
own origins, the story concerns an impossible moment of the origins of society. This moment 
is impossible because the terms through which the story would emerge as comprehensible are 
only set down in the aftermath of the story itself. Freud neither aims ‘at exactitude’ nor insists 
‘on certainty’ (Freud, 1913, p. 143). His imprecision, his spare telling, leaves the story open 
to embellishment. It appeals to our imagination and we are drawn to fill in the colour for 
ourselves. Through Freud’s scant detail, we find ourselves imagining the Neanderthal tribe. 
We see the silverback jealously guarding the females. When Freud suggests some ‘cultural 
advance, perhaps, command over some new weapon’, we may recall the opening scenes of 
Stanley Kubrick’s 2001: A Space Odyssey, in which the homo erectus discovers that a femur 
makes a rather good bludgeon. 
 
The danger in Freud’s sparsity is that it invites our own particular images to rush in. We 
imagine the scene and, in so imagining, we add distorting and obfuscating detail of our own, 
often shaped by prevalent cultural images and, thus,  by prevalent cultural assumptions. 
When, in his Seminar XX, Lacan translates Freud’s myth into logical notation, he is 
effectively separating the underpinning logic of Freud’s story from the picture we paint on 
top. Abstracting the logic from the myth, or representing the myth as logic, Lacan performs 
two vital tasks. First, he makes it more difficult for us to abscond to the imaginary and 
overload the story with points of identification. When we watch Kubrick’s film, while we see 
ourselves as distinct from the homo erectus squabbling at the waterhole, the very possibility 
of this distinction relies on a presumed lineage. We are not that, but we are from that. 
Similarly, despite Freud’s insistence that his self-authored myth is posited and projected onto 
a pre-history, the narrative nature of the tale – ‘One day …’ (Freud, 1913, p. 141) – invites 
the imaginary, and thus invites an identification. The subtle effect of this is a naturalisation of 
the truth of the story. Myth becomes history. This brings us to Lacan’s second vital task. In 
rewriting the myth as logic, Lacan is able to emphasise the logical, rather than pseudo-
empirical, basis of the myth. The myth is a construct which describes a construction. 
 






The pair of logical statements on the left side can be understood as the stripped-down version 
of the core of the Freudian myth. Gone is the back story. Now we simply have the point. 
Read in terms of formal logic,  the first of these two statements could be rendered, ∃𝑥𝑥∅𝑥𝑥, as 
there exists one instance of 𝑥𝑥 which is not determined by ∅.∃ here is simply the standard 
logical notation for the existential, meaning, ‘there exists’. The second statement, ∀𝑥𝑥∅𝑥𝑥, can 
be read as ‘all instances of 𝑥𝑥 are determined by ∅′. The ∀ here simply indicating the 
universal, meaning ‘all’. The apparent contradiction here – that we are simultaneously being 
told that there is an exception and that there are no exceptions – is resolved when we focus on 
the logical process being described. In order to establish the set of those 𝑥𝑥 which are 
determined by ∅, it is necessary that we posit an instance of 𝑥𝑥 which is not determined by ∅. 
Without this external determiner, the set of 𝑥𝑥 would be logically inconsistent, insofar as there 
would be no limit condition to allow it to function as comprehensible. Put simply, without the 
conceptual exception to a rule, the rule is not a rule. For the claim that all x are y, there has to 
be, at least in theory, the possibility of an x which is not y. Without this limitation, the 
statement is merely an analytical tautology, as in the classic ‘all bachelors are unmarried’. 
This rather abstract but crucial point is perhaps illuminated if we recall the original myth. The 
one who is not determined by ∅ is the primal father; he who was murdered, consumed, and 
elevated. Here we begin to translate terms once again, and already lose something of the 
paramount abstraction of Lacan’s representation. The Greek letter ∅ is taken here to represent 
the phallus. In the context of the formulae, when combined with 𝑥𝑥 as ∅𝑥𝑥, we can read this as 
the phallic function. ∀𝑥𝑥∅𝑥𝑥 thus describes, according to Lacan, ‘that it is through the phallic 
function that man as a whole acquires his inscription’ (Lacan, 1975b/1999, p. 79). Without 
the phallic function, man cannot be written. The bar placed over ∅𝑥𝑥 in the upper formula 
indicates a negation. As such, ∅𝑥𝑥 describes a negation of the phallic function. Taken as a 
whole, Lacan paraphrases the upper formula, ∃𝑥𝑥∅𝑥𝑥 as la fonction du père (Lacan, 1975a, p. 
101), which could variously be translated as ‘the father function’, ‘the father’s function’ or 
‘the function of the father’, the subtle shifts in meaning that the English brings forward being 
not insignificant (Lacan, 1975b/1999,p. 79). Here we can begin to appreciate the danger in 
superimposing Freud on Lacan. While Lacan’s logical statements perform the task of 
elevating  the core of Freud’s myth out of the wash of the imaginary, any superimposition 
risks reversing this elevation and, moreover, confusing the precision at which Lacan aims.  
 
Where we might understand ∃𝑥𝑥∅𝑥𝑥 to represent the primal father, insofar as he is, himself, the 
anchor of the phallic function, rather than being subject to it, this recuperation to Freud places 
too much emphasis on the father and not enough on the function. What Lacan is concerned 
with is the function, the father function. Again, while ∅𝑥𝑥 might helpfully be understood to 
represent castration (there exists one who castrates, and is thus not subject to castration), this 
again separates the terms with the effect of implying an agency. It is not, for Lacan, that the 
father castrates. It is rather that the father function effects a castration. We need to remind 
ourselves that where Freud is presenting a myth that easily slips into a supposition of a 
prehistory, Lacan seeks to achieve a logical atemporality. 
 
Reading Freud into Lacan, we can see the set of ∀𝑥𝑥 which is determined by ∅ as the band of 
brothers. As Freud tells it, the murder of the father heralds the process of foundation of law 
and culture. Having murdered the father, the band of brothers experience remorse and 
consequently prohibit the very thing they sought to gain through his murder; access to or 
possession of the women of the tribe. This prohibition of incest (they are presumably free to 
pursue women of other groups, if they can) marks the inauguration of law. In 
commemoration of the father, they proceed to feast on his remains, thus instantiating culture, 
as well as engaging in a very literal internalisation of and direct identification with the father. 
Thus, Freud’s myth accounts for the impossible origins of law and culture, and the 
emergence of society and group functioning, cooperation, communion and  identity. 
 
In stripping the core point of the myth back to its logic, Lacan seeks not only to dispense with 
the lure of colourful detail, but also to emphasise the direction in which we read the elements 
in play. In Freud’s version, there is a series of explicit and implied moments of cause and 
effect. The father’s greed and possessiveness, aided by their own lust, causes the brothers to 
revolt. The father’s death causes the brothers to experience remorse (although it is never 
entirely clear why). This remorse inspires a totem feast and an instantiation of law. 
Everything works in a conventional, narrative chronology. Lacan’s logic, however, is 
retroactive; the terms must be read backwards. Hence, when he comes to comment on his 
own backboard scribblings, it is ∀𝑥𝑥∅𝑥𝑥 to which he turns first (Lacan, 1975b/1999, p. 79). 
Only after explicating ∀𝑥𝑥∅𝑥𝑥 does he add an explanation to ∃𝑥𝑥∅𝑥𝑥. Underpinning Lacan’s 
strategy here is a core element of his theory which had been in place for decades by this point 
(Lacan, 1949/2006, 79). It is only from within the confines of language that we can come to 
posit that which would have preceded or founded the possibility of language. All 𝑥𝑥 are 
determined by the phallus, without which they could not be inscribed within the symbolic. It 
makes no sense to talk of a chronology here, as any positing of a ‘before’ of this inscription 
would be to impossibly assume the possibility of an inscription before inscription. This is 
where Freud’s myth starts to come a little undone. While a casual skip through the myth 
appears to hold together well enough, when we start to consider some of the key moments 
seriously, the story starts to fall apart. The myth is intended to describe the origin of society 
but appears to rely on the existence of some -- at least proto- -- social organisation from the 
outset. The brothers react to their murderous deed with remorse, uggesting that this remorse 
is an effect of guilt and, thus, a moral conscience is at the same time the source of law, and, 
hence, guilt and the possibility of a conscience. Lacan’s atemporal telling makes sense of this 
narrative collapse. The conditions of possibility of the myth are only ever posited back from 
within the conditions for which the myth seeks to account. Where the colourful, mythic 
dimension of Freud’s story, as well as his quasi-scientistic appeal to Darwin , encourages us 
to posit the myth in a prehistory such that it becomes a case of that then explains something 
of us now, Lacan’s logical refashioning allows us to appreciate the atemporality of the logic. 
From the position of being under the sign of the phallus, the necessity of one not under the 
sign of the phallus must be posited.  
 
But that is not all. The other side of Lacan’s table presents an alternative conundrum. Here, 
we read, there does not exist one who is not determined by ∅ (∃𝑥𝑥∅𝑥𝑥) and, yet, not all 𝑥𝑥 is 
determined by ∅ (∀𝑥𝑥∅𝑥𝑥). The standard reading of the two pairs of statements, the left-hand 
and the right-hand side, is that one describes the male position and the other describes the 
female position. We should be careful, however, to avoid the lure of any naturalism here. 
Lacan repeatedly emphasises the act of inscription. What we are concerned with, then, is an 
écriture: what can be put down, articulated, formalised.  
 
It is in introducing the second side that Lacan makes the crucial statement which is at one and 
the same time staggeringly obvious, and so counter to our experience as to encourage us to 
glide over it entirely. Where the first, left-hand side is ‘the side of man’ (Lacan, 1975b/1999, 
p. 80), when it comes to the second side, the side we would typically describe as woman’s, he 
tells us that ‘Any speaking being whatsoever […] whether provided with the attributes of 
masculinity […] or not, is allowed to inscribe itself in this part’ (Lacan, 1975b/1999, p. 80). 
So, we have two positions available. One entails the inscription of ‘man’, the other the 
inscription of ‘woman’ and yet, this latter side is open to all.  
 
The core distinction between the two positions is not, then, the nature of its occupants. Lacan 
is at pains to make the point that there is nothing natural in play here. This is the obvious 
point. However, if we move beyond the still commonly accepted naturalism of the masculine 
/ feminine binary and grasp the seemingly evident point that, not only is not everyone born 
with a clearly defined external genital manifestation which would satisfy the criteria of 
standard categorisation -- added to  the fact that even ‘deeper’ biological markers prove no 
more amenable to a strict binary positioning that much of what we consider masculine and 
feminine is not directly rooted in biology – then the originality and significance of Lacan’s 
point begins to emerge. If the sexual binary is a convenient, but ultimately unjustified, 
construct, then, in unmasking it, is not the rational conclusion that we ought to embrace a 
thoroughly non-binary perspective? Clearly Lacan, in presenting his table as having two 
sides, is not doing this, however. He simultaneously rejects the naturalism of binary 
convention and, literally, reinscribes a binary.  
 
Lacan’s point is that within the particular context of this discussion, and structurally 
speaking, the fact of two positions is what is available. Not because these two positions are 
naturally what there is, but rather because the positions available are defined in relation to a 
single term. It is then, after all, a black and white issue. Or, perhaps more accurately put, it is 
a black and not black issue. For Lacan, we are not concerned here with alternative positions, 
each of which would be determined in its own way. Were we, then the possibility of multiple 
positions would easily open up. Rather, we are dealing with an either/or which is predicated 
on a single notion. This single notion is the possibility of universality.  
 
Returning to the logical notation, the left-hand side of the graph describes, as we have seen, 
the formation of a stable set: ∀𝑥𝑥∅𝑥𝑥. The stability of the set, its condition of possibility, 
requires the positing of that which would be excepted: ∃𝑥𝑥∅𝑥𝑥. Phrased otherwise, the so-
called male side is defined by the uniformity of its participants, a uniformity gained or 
established on the basis of the One who is excluded. But there is necessarily another 
exclusion here. We might say that the left-hand side of the graph depicts a theoretical model. 
For this model to be operationalised, it needs to be applied in practice. This application is to 
the variety of speaking beings, the actuality of those who find themselves ‘in the position of 
inhabiting language’ (Lacan, 1975b/1999, p. 80). While, theoretically, it is possible that the 
entirety of those who find themselves in the position of inhabiting language, as the formula 
suggests, might fall under the sign of ∅𝑥𝑥, in practice this is not likely. Thus, another side is 
imperative. If the first side, the male side, is defined in terms of universality, then the other 
side indicates the non-universal.  
Of course, we should be careful to distinguish between experience and ideal here. Lacan is 
not claiming that there is a uniformity to the male experience. All men are not, after all, 
equal. What he is seeking to describe is what is inscribed: the ideal of the masculine. But 
whose ideal? The ideal of culture, of society. The ideal of a culture which operates with a 
headless will, insofar as culture is not something determined by accountable individual 
consciousnesses. Insofar as each actual speaking being who would call himself ‘man’ 
necessarily fails to attain the ideal, so the many variants of walking, talking masculinity 
emerge. But the ideal remains in place … or at least it did. Or perhaps it did. Recent 
headlines would seem to suggest that there is at the very least a shaking of faith in this ideal 
(see, for a few examples from  very many, Dupois-Deri, 2018; Mishra, 2018; Raisin, 2017). 
Whether these discussion pieces explicitly claim to identify a crisis in masculinity or seek to 
deny one, either way they raise the question of such, which then necessarily  indicates a 
wavering of the ideal. When Jordan Peterson complains that men are being ‘pushed too hard 
to feminize’, the pushback here clearly indicates a crisis of masculinity (Peterson in Sanneh, 
2018). 
 
If this so-called crisis appears to describe a faltering of the ideal of masculinity, it is not a 
terribly new thing. Already over thirty years ago, Anthony Easthope described this crisis, 
pointing back to the classic era of Hollywood cinema. According to Easthope, the classic 
leading man, such as Cary Grant or Rex Harrison, simply acts, embodying without fanfare 
the masculine ideal. They, as Easthope (1986) puts it, simply do ‘what a man’s gotta do’ . In 
contrast, by the 1970s Dirty Harry is loudly describing his phallic symbol, as he insists on 
spelling out the specifications of his hardware before putting it to use, thus indicating the 
ideal’s slippage. When the masculine ideal has to be exclaimed to be noticed, when the 
phallic symbol has to be proclaimed and quite literally shoved in our faces, its power is 
clearly on the wane.  
 
This is not, then, a crisis in the sense that it is difficult to be a man. It has always been 
difficult to be a man, insofar as the ideal of masculinity is precisely that; an ideal. This can be 
seen in exemplary fashion in the split between the titular character and the father in George 
Stevens’ Shane. Where the father portrays loyalty, love and dependability, his admirable 
characteristics are inseparable from his weakness. Shane, on the other hand, as the 
embodiment of the masculine ideal, is fearless, but without being reckless. He is resolute and 
morally unwavering. Yet, in this very disambiguity, Shane is unattainable. He is 
unsustainable both within the domestic context and, ultimately, within the mise-en-scène of 
the film. As Shane eventually rides off into the proverbial sunset, Joey, the boy, calls after 
him, already, before he has even quite gone, reconfiguring events, mythologizing him, then 
beseeching him not to leave, and then issuing his final plea: “and mother wants you. I know 
she does!” Shane is here posited as the ultimate object of feminine fantasy; the one who will 
not disappoint. But, crucially, he is posited as such by the son, by he one who would aspire, 
hopelessly, to become that ideal. 
 
The outmoded nature of the ideal as presented in Shane is brought to the fore in James 
Mangold’s Logan. Mangold’s film not only explicitly references Stevens’, but  restages 
crucial aspects of it, presenting itself as a reboot of the classic western but with necessary 
changes. If we are to read the central character as a reimaging of Shane, then the striking shift 
is that he is no longer merely the ideal man but, as with Dirty Harry, his status as ideal man 
overtly exceeds the supposed natural and is supplemented with prosthetic elements. Where 
Shane was modestly ideal, stolidly portraying the fantasy and then quietly riding off at the 
end to allow the fantasy to subsist, Logan inverts this operation and is boldly, undeniably, 
fantasmatic. He, and the film itself, is also undeniably brutal in its violence, where both 
Shane the film and Shane the character are understated, Shane’s moment of violence 
resonating precisely because it only erupts after a prolonged series of provocations in the face 
of which he maintains his composure. Logan lacks from the outset this self-control and this 
lack of containment is evident throughout the entire film. In Shane we are presented with the 
domestic father and then, by way of comparison, with Shane, in keeping with Freud’s myth, 
the unattainable ideal father. In Logan, on the other hand, we are bombarded with a surfeit of 
father figures. Not only do we have the titular character with whom Laura, the partial 
counterpart to Shane’s Joey, can identify (they share the same mutancy), but we have the, in 
many ways, more obvious father figure of Charles Xavier, the once all-father of the X-Men, 
with his psionic powers which shape the very perception of reality. Supplementing this 
imaginary and real father,  the symbolic father appears in the figure of Dr Rice, the arch 
rationalist who wishes to preserve the clean functional utility of the mutants without the 
bothersome interference of their desire. Where, for Joey, the model Shane proffers functions 
precisely because he leaves, Logan documents the demise of father after father, from Will 
Munson’s domestic father to, eventually, Logan himself, and leaving, ultimately, the primal 
horde, the children, to ride off at the end. Curiously, at the close of the film, having buried 
Logan, Laura recites a section from Shane’s closing monologue. The film dissects the father 
and ends with an appeal to the good old days, the classic ideal man but now he is clearly 
receding, submerged in levels of diegesis, a character within a film within a film. Put into 
Laura’s mouth, Shane’s words cannot carry the same meaning. When Shane tells Joey that 
‘There’s no living with the killing’, he is espousing a firm moral code. It has the status of a 
fact. When Laura uses the same words, she is expressing a choice. Where Shane is declaring 
an adherence to something which exists outside of himself, Laura is separating herself from 
what has gone before, but without appeal to another ground. She simultaneously embraces 
Logan as she announces she is leaving behind what he has stood for. She is describing an 
ending, but an ending which is resolutely not a reinscription. In Shane’s mouth, the words 
inscribe the function of the father. In Laura’s, they mark its obsolescence.  
 
This returns us to the significance of the binary logic outlined above. It is not only the male 
side which is conditioned by the signifier of the phallus;the other side too falls under this 
sign, albeit in a different way. On the right-hand side we read firstly, ∃𝑥𝑥∅𝑥𝑥, and then, ∀𝑥𝑥∅𝑥𝑥. 
At first glance, the first line here appears to be a straightforward negation of the function of 
the father; there does not exist one who is not determined by the phallus. This would be to 
say, for those who choose this side of the line, there is no equivalent of the father function. If 
we recall that the effect of the father function is to establish the possibility of definition and a 
stable set, i.e. ∀𝑥𝑥, then the negation of the father function means the absence of the possibility 
of such a set. The lower line of the right-hand side then tells us that ‘not all’ (pas tout) 𝑥𝑥 
(Lacan, 1975a, p. 101) is determined by ∅. The ‘not all’ or ‘pas tout’ is crucial here. Where 
the temptation might be to read ‘not all’ as synonymous with ‘not everyone’ or ‘some of’, the 
French term can also be translated as ‘not whole’ or ‘not wholly’. This sense of ‘not all’ is 
consistent with the logic in play here. It is not, then, that those who find themselves on the 
right-hand side are not determined by ∅. Rather, it is that they are not wholly determined by 
it. Each 𝑥𝑥 on this side retains, as Lacan tells us, a choice: ‘le choix de se poser dans le ∅𝑥𝑥 ou 
bien de n’en pas être’ (Lacan, 1975a: 101). They have the choice of whether to position 
themselves within the set of those who are determined by ∅ or not. In choosing the ‘not’, they 
choose to place themselves outside of phallic governance. But what is the cost of such a 
choice? 
 
The cost of this choice, for those who would seek to establish and maintain order and control, 
is no doubt high. Those who are contained within the ∅ set are consistent, stable, universal. 
They are amenable to routine. They march in time and follow orders. Without those within 
the set of ∅, the machine would not function. They are the utilitarian foot-soldiers, machinic 
and subservient to pure reason. Those who choose to inconsistently be within the set of ∅ 
enjoy a partial freedom from this servitude. But freedom also means a lack of security. It is 
important to note that the logic Lacan is unfurling here is of a choice, not a decision. Where a 
choice (ceosan) entails sampling, selecting, and would be particular to an instance, a decision 
(de caedere) is a cut, an irretrievable occurrence.  
 
If we keep in mind that the original Freudian myth of the primal horde was supposed to 
account for the possibility of society,  law and language, then, were the ‘not all’ taken to 
indicate that some are, some are not,  this would be to suggest an irreversible banishing of a 
portion and an absolutisation of the rest. We would effectively only have one side of the 
binary. What we have instead is a binary entailing, on the one hand, those who are entirely 
under the sign of the phallus and, on the other, those who are occasionally or inconsistently 
under the sign of the phallus. What is established, and maintained, under the sign of the 
phallus is the law, and those who would identify with the law. The subjective position 
assumed here is necessarily a lifeless subjectivity, one given over, without will. It is the 
persistent possibility of choice on the other side which opens up a space of and for something 
else. 
 
In the first sentence of his twentieth seminar, Encore, Lacan builds a direct bridge to his 
seventh seminar, The Ethics of Psychoanalysis, and continues to refer to it and evoke themes 
from it as the seminar progresses (e.g. Lacan, S20: pp. 1, 52–3, 57, 69, 100, 118). The notion 
of ethics which Lacan works towards in his seventh seminar is one which stands in 
conceptual opposition to the law. It is not that ethics is necessarily against the law or 
diametrically opposed to the substance of the law. It is that ethics, as Lacan develops it, is the 
necessary subjective supplement to the law. The law contains no choice. In order to be law, it 
can contain no choice. The only choice we have with regard to the law is whether or not, or 
how, to adhere to the law. This choice  cannot itself be subsumed within the law. Every 
encounter with the law demands a choice, to be within it or to be outwith it; de n’en pas 
être.This choice is the necessary supplement of the law. It is not that the choice to be outwith 
the law, to refuse the law in this or that instance, is somehow essentially ethical. It is rather 
that maintaining the possibility of choice is the very definition of the ethical. Blind adherence 
to the law can never, by definition, be ethical. It is in the choice to follow this or that law, or 
not, that the ethical consists. 
 
Lacan illustrates this point with reference to Sophocles’ Antigone. Lacan draws attention to 
the fact that in Sophocles’ play the chorus describe Antigone as ώμός (Lacan, 1986/1992, p. 
263). The conventional translation for this term in Sophocles is ‘unflexible’, which results in 
a rather conventional positioning of Antigone as the difficult or stubborn woman, the one 
who refuses to conform to the status quo. Lacan offers an alternative translation, suggesting 
that ώμός might be better rendered as ‘raw’. The sense of ‘raw’ here echoes the title of the 
first volume of Claude Levi-Strauss’s Mythologiques, Le Cru et le Cuit, The Raw and the 
Cooked. ‘Cru’ not only has the sense of ‘uncooked’, but more broadly of ‘unrefined’, as in 
the English word ‘crude’.  In Lévi-Strauss’s text, the point is to do with being brought into 
culture. That which is cooked is that which has been worked upon, processed in some fashion 
and given a place within culture. That which is not cooked or processed, that which is raw, is 
not utterly beyond culture, but neither is it exactly a part of the cultural (Lévi-Strauss, 1964). 
Antigone is, then, the one who has chosen to be not wholly within the terms of the symbolic 
order, the one who, perhaps unsurprisingly, refuses the sign of the father. It is in this sense 
that she is raw. 
 
The temptation here is perhaps to read Antigone as a feminine model, the rebel of the 
feminist cause avant la lettre. This would conform to the straightforward reading of the graph 
of sexuation which sees it as describing, and thus reinscribing, the traditional sexual binary: 
on the one side, the male; on the other, the female. But, as we have seen, the binary Lacan 
proposes is of quite a different sort. It is a binary  marked not by two positive, but different, 
positions, positions which would somehow impossibly contain their own foundations. 
Lacan’s binaries function in relation to a single factor: the phallus. This is not to endorse the 
privileging of the male position. The phallus, for Lacan, is not the anatomical penis, but 
rather a signifying function. Fundamentally, the phallus is the descriptor of that which 
institutes the very possibility of difference. In this sense, as already accounted for in Freud’s 
myth, it is the marker of the possibility of language, of law, of culture, of society. The binary 
that emerges then concerns how one identifies in relation to the phallus, in relation to the 
possibility of structure, of law. Either one finds oneself on the side of the phallus or one does 
not. To find oneself on the side of the phallus is not to say one has a privileged access to it. 
There is no access to it. The act of finding oneself on the side of the phallus is a position of 
identity. Identity here should be understood as a process, which is to say that it is always, 
necessarily, incomplete. We are all always in the process of identifying. Which is also, then, 
to say that the position with which we identify is not what we are. Those on the side of the 
phallus, insofar as they are identifying with the one who has the phallus, are, then, primarily 
marked by the fact that they do not have it.  
 
This necessary failure of identity is one way of understanding Lacan’s (1975a) claim that il 
n’y a pas de rapport sexuel ( p. 21). It is not simply that there is no rapport between the 
sexes, that the two sides of the binary do not complement each other. It is also that there is no 
rapport within any one side. If the phallus is that in relation to which sexual identity is forged 
or adopted, the lack of rapport here is also the failure of that identity. Returning to the 
question of masculinity, we can see that the choice to identify as male indicates more about 
what one is not than it could possibly say about what one is. It is perhaps no wonder then that 
the male finds himself in crisis. The more light that is shone on this lack, the more the crisis 
will be felt. 
 
What is more, in exposing the non-essential and non-biological foundation of the position of 
identification as striving to have the phallus, Lacan indicates a point he was not yet ready to 
make explicit himself. If the two sides of the graph do not, and cannot, articulate in any 
natural or necessary way to the convention of two sexes, then it is not only the right side that 
avails itself to ‘Any speaking being whatsoever’ (Lacan, 1975b/1999, p. 80). As the 
characteristics which would conventionally be ascribed to the masculine become more 
culturally available, the conventional domain of the male, the side of law, becomes available 
to all. But before we rush to celebrate the storming of the gates, we should recall that this side 
is the side of the dead, the side enchained to the law, turning in a well-worn rut of rite.  
 
Of course, the other side of the graph is no less lacking. The difference is that the other side 
never claimed not to be lacking. While those tethered to the male side of the graph identify 
themselves in the aspiration to have the phallus, those on the other side remain, in a sense, 
free. Lacan’s Antigone is not, then, like Hegel’s, committed to an alternative structure or 
body of law (Hegel, 1835/1975, p. 464). Where Hegel wants to posit Sophocles’ drama as 
staging a binary opposition between divine familial law, on the one hand, and human law or 
the law of the polis on the other, Lacan’s binary is more absolute. There is the side of law, of 
society, of logic, which is represented in Creon’s edicts. Then there is Antigone, raw, 
untamed, uncontained and uncontainable. In this reading, the figure of Antigone emerges as a 
representative of the other side, the second side of the graph, which is open to all, with the 
emphasis on ‘open’.  
 
What Lacan has presented us with is a way of understanding sexual identity which unmasks 
the available positions, allowing us to appreciate that that with which we identify is not what 
we are, and, thus, that the positions adopted therein are contingent choices with which we are 
free to engage. We are not, then, fixed in a traditional binary of, on the one hand, male and, 
on the other, female, as two radically incommensurate but equally substantial positions. What 
we are presented with instead is a choice of the conventionally male on the one hand, and on 
the other, those who refuse this restricted position. On the one hand, the cooked; on the other, 
the raw. On the one hand, the strictures of the law; on the other, the possibility of ethics. The 
crisis in masculinity consists in the fact that it is a position predicated on an impossible 
assumption of self-identity. The notion that this identity is natural, absolute and thus 
inescapable is perhaps understandable as an emission of and from the obsessive need for 
certainty and containment which would characterise this position. The fact that the male is 
never adequate to the male ideal only offers up two options: deny and insist on the lacking 
certainty; or step out with Antigone and take a walk on the raw side. Here opens up the slide 
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